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Case Note:
FIRST AMENDMENT-FREE SPEECH: RIGHT TO KNOW-LIMIT OF
SCHOOL BOARD'S DISCRETION IN CURRICULAR CHOICE-
PUBLIC SCHOOL LIBRARY AS MARKETPLACE OF IDEAS
Minarcini v. Strongsville City School District, 541 F.2d 577 (6th Cir. 1976).
I. INTRODUCTION
BROAD DISCRETIONARY authority to make curricular choices is vested
in states and in the local school boards to which the states have dele-
gated that authority. Although the authority is limited by the Federal Con-
stitution, the Supreme Court has not imposed a free speech constraint on
school board decisionmaking. In Minarcini v. Strongsville City School Dis-
trict,' however, the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that the
school board's removal of the books the board found objectionable from a
public school library was unconstitutional as a violation of the freedom of
speech clause of the first amendment.
The freedom of speech clause constrains governmental regulation of
speech solely on the basis of content to assure a free flow of communication.
Curricular choice involves the regulation of the content of communications
to students. Because the free flow of communications in public schools can
be restricted for educational purposes, however, school boards have hereto-
fore exercised unfettered discretion over curriculae. In the past, the freedom
of speech clause has not been applied in the context of public education
when impermissible censorship was found to have motivated a school board's
decisionmaking; no clear line of authority supports the Sixth Circuit's con-
clusion that this first amendment value should henceforth be given protec-
tion in the context of curricular choice. 2
1. 541 F.2d 577 (6th Cir. 1976).
2. See Presidents Council Dist. 25 v. Community School Bd. No. 25, 457 F.2d 289 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 998 (1972); O'Neil, Libraries, Liberties and the First Am'endment,
42 U.CIN. L. REv. 209, 211 (1973).
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II. THE PROBLEM
A. The Traditional Role
of School Boards
In the area of education states have traditionally exercised plenary
power. 3 Subject only to the constitutional limitations articulated by the
Supreme Court,4 states are empowered to operate their schools as they see
fit. Almost every state prescribes some subject matter, and a good number
designate mandatory subjects. 5 In addition, responsibility for formulating
details regarding courses and subject offerings has been delegated to school
administrators or administrative bodies. 6 The public school curriculum has
been used by states and school boards to prescribe courses "plainly essential
to good citizenship," and to prohibit courses "manifestly inimical to the pub-
lic welfare." 7 The stated objective has been to inculcate students with val-
ues considered necessary to develop productive citizens.8
Until recently, decisionmaking by school administrators and administra-
tive bodies has, for the most part, escaped scrutiny by the legal profession 9
and the general public. 10 The judicial process has only been invoked when
school board decisions result in a curriculum which expresses political, so-
cial, and religious values not shared by some members of the community,'
or when teachers have employed unauthorized materials or have challenged
subject matter prohibitions. 1 2 For several reasons, courts have traditionally
been reluctant to intervene in curricular disputes. 1 3 Recognizing their lack
3. E.g., E. REUTTER, JR. & R. HA.MILToN, THE LAv OF PUBLIC EDUCATION 73 (1976);
Reutter, The Law and the Curriculuin, 20 LAw c& CONTEMP. PROBS. 91 (1955); Seitz, Supervi-
sion of Public Elementary and Secondary School Pupils Through State Control Over Cur-
riculum and Textbook Selection, 20 LAw & CoNTEmp. PROBS. 104 (1955); Project, Education
and the Law: State Interests and Individual Rights, 74 MICH. L. REv. 1373, 1423 (1976) [here-
inafter cited as Project].
4. Seitz, supra note 3, at 104.
5. Reutter, supra note 3, at 92-95.
6. G. JOHNSON, EDUCATION LAW 92 (1969).
7. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534 (1925); see Reutter, supra note 3, at
95-96.
8. See Reutter, supra note 3, at 95-96; Project, supra note 3, at 1424-25; see R. DAWSON
& K. PRNVWITT, POLITICAL SOCIALIZATION 147 (1969).
9. Goldstein, The Scope and Sources of School Board Authority to Regulate Student Con-
duct and Status: A Nonconstitutional Analysis, 117 U. PA. L. REv. 373, 375-76 (1969).
10. See F. WIRT & M. KiRST, THE POLITICAL WEB OF AmERICAN SCHOOLS 217 (1972).
11. Project, supra note 3, at 1425.
12. See, e.g., Keefe v. Geanakos, 418 F.2d 359 (1st Cir. 1969); Parducci v. Rutland, 316 F.
Supp. 352 (M.D. Ala. 1970) (both cases involved the discharge of high school teachers who
refused to comply with orders from school authorities to desist from assigning materials for
outside reading which school officials found offensive and inappropriate).
13. Project, supra note 3, at 1425, citing Nahmod, First Amendment Protection for Learn-
ing and Teaching: The Scope of Judicial Review, 18 WAYNE L. REv. 1479 (1972).
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of expertise, courts have hesitated to encroach upon the educational exper-
tise of school administrators, especially where judgments of educational
value may be required. 14 There has also been a reluctance to substitute the
value judgment of a nonelected judiciary for that of an elected school board
which theoretically reflects community values. 15 Because the curricular de-
cisionmaking process is not based solely on quantitative or even objective
data, there is a considerable amount of latitude for deliberation and for com-
plex political interaction in resolving value conflicts among groups and indi-
viduals. 1 6 Finally, this hesitancy to intervene is motivated by a respect for
the autonomy of educational institutions. 17 Thus, school boards have been
afforded a preferred position in curricular disputes.' 8
B. The Facts of Minarcini
In Minarcini v. Strongsville City School District '9 the Sixth Circuit, in a
unique decision, refused to grant complete deference to the curricular
choices of the board of education. In Minarcini, a class action suit was
brought by five public high school students through their parents as next
friends to challenge the school board's authority to determine what books
could (1) be selected as high school textbooks, (2) be purchased for the high
school library, (3) be removed from the high school library, and (4) be
banned from the high school classroom. 20 The case was simplified since in
the lower court the parties conceded the literary value of the novels and
eliminated obscenity as an issue.21
There were three parts to the plaintiff's complaint. Part I charged that
the school board had violated plaintiff's first and fourteenth amendment
rights by refusing to approve Joseph Heller's Catch-22 and Kurt Vonnegut's
God Bless You, Mr. Rosewater, despite faculty recommendation of these
books. On this issue the district court ruled in favor of the school board, 22
reasoning that discretion as to selection of books had to be lodged some-
where, and there was no constitutionial prohibition to prevent its being
lodged in elected school board officials. 23 The district court perceived the
14. Id. at 1426, citing Developments in the Law: Academic Freedom, 81 HARV. L. REV.
1048, 1050 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Developkients] (footnote omitted).
15. Id., citing Miller, Teachers Freedom of Expression Within the Classroom: A Search for
Standards, 8 GA. L. REV. 837, 847 (1974).
16. F. WIRT & M. KIRST, supra note 10, at 205-07.
17. Developments, supra note 14, at 1050.
18. Project, supra note 3, at 1454.
19. 541 F.2d 577 (6th Cir. 1976).
20. Id. at 578.
21. Id. at 580.
22. 384 F. Supp. 698, 704 (N.D. Ohio 1974).
23. Id. at 704-05.
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issue to be one of procedural due process. 24 It found the board's selection
decisions to have been neither arbitrary nor capricious. 2 5 The Sixth Circuit
affirmed the decision of the district court, approving both its findings and
reasoning. 26
In Part II plaintiffs charged that the board had also violated first and
fourteenth amendment rights by ordering Vonnegut's Cat's Cradle and Hel-
ler's Catch-22 to be removed from the library. The district court dismissed
this portion of the complaint by extrapolating from the board's authority to
select books for the library a complementary power to remove books from
the library.2 7 On this issue the Sixth Circuit reversed, holding:
A library is a storehouse of knowledge. When created for a public
school it is an important privilege created by the state for the ben-
efit of students in the school. That privilege is not subject to being
withdrawn by succeeding school boards whose members might de-
sire to "winnow" the library for books the contents of which oc-
casioned their displeasure or disapproval. 28
The appeals court ordered the district court to declare the two school board
resolutions banning Catch-22 and Cat's Cradle null and void and to direct
the board to return the books to the school library.2 9
In Part III of their complaint plaintiffs alleged deprivation of first and
fourteenth amendment rights because the school board resolutions effec-
tively prohibited teacher and student classroom discussion of the books and
their use as supplemental reading material. The district court found the facts
to be insufficient to support this allegation.30 The Sixth Circuit affirmed
this finding.3 1
The reasoning applied by the Sixth Circuit in Minarcini was unique in
invoking the first amendment freedom of speech to attack a curricular choice
of a local school board. The Supreme Court, in striking down legislative
curricular prohibitions, has limited discretion in curricular choice through
the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment and the establishment
and free exercise clauses of the first amendment, 32 but the Court has not yet
24. See 541 F.2d at 579-80.
25. 384 F. Supp. at 706.
26. 541 F.2d at 579-80.
27. Id. at 580-81.
28. Id. at 581.
29. Id. at 584.
30. 384 F. Supp. at 706-08.
31. 541 F.2d at 584.
32. See, e.g., Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (due process); Epperson v. Arkansas,
393 U.S. 97 (1968) (establishment and free exercise clauses).
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adopted the freedom of speech clause as a constraint on the curricular choice
of states or school boards. 33 Therefore, in order to understand the potential
impact of Minarcini it is necessary to review the prior state of the law gov-
erning a school board's power to determine curricular choices.
III. LIMITING THE CHOICE
A. Due Process and Free Exercise
In Meyer v. Nebraska 34 the Supreme Court acknowledged the states'
power to prescribe school curriculum and recognized as valid the state pur-
pose of promoting civic cohesiveness through curricular planning. Neverthe-
less, the Court held that a law making it a crime to teach young children in
any language other than English was an unconstitutional means of achieving
the stated purpose of inculcation of civic virtues; that state interest is not
adequate to support restrictions upon the liberty of parent, teacher, and
pupil guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment. 35 Because "mere knowl-
edge of the German language cannot reasonably be regarded as harmful," 3 6
the Court struck down the statute as arbitrary and not reasonably related to
a valid state goal.37 Thus, Meyer stands for the proposition that there are
fundamental rights in parents and the state to control the education of chl-
dren, in teachers to teach, and in students to learn, all embodied in the
concept of liberty under the fourteenth amendment. Meyer also imposed on
the state a strict burden of justification when it would infringe upon these
rights.38 The significance of the substantive due process analysis of Meyer
on curricular choice has been debated, 39 but if read expansively, it seems to
support broad academic freedom. 40
33. See, e.g., Nahmod, supra note 13, at 1504. Underlying the inquiry into the applicability
of the freedom of speech clause to curricular choice is the controversy over where responsibility
for making educational policies should lie. See, e.g., Project, supra note 3, at 1422 n.258, which
further reflects "an upheaval in social, political and cultural values that has ... brought into
question the efficacy of education. Id.
34. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
35. Id. The statute was aimed at assimilating the recent wave of primarily German immi-
grants.
36. Id. at 400.
37. Id. at 403.
38. The Court said: "No emergency has arisen which renders knowledge by a child of some
language other than English so clearly harmful as to justify its inhibition with the consequent
infringement of rights long freely enjoyed." Id.
39. Compare Goldstein, The Asserted Constitutional Right of Public School Teachers to
Determine What They Teach, 124 U. PA. L. Rtv. 1293, 1306-11 (1976), with Shauer, School
Books, Lesson Plans, and the Constitution, 78 W. VA. L. REv. 287, 307-08 (1976).
40. In Meyer, the interests of parents and teachers coincided. Under other circumstances,
however, recognition of the right of a teacher to teach and the right of a parent to control the
child's education may conflict. See, e.g., Goldstein, supra note 39, at 1308 n.48, 1321 n.94.
1038 [Vol. 27:1034
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In Epperson v. Arkansas,4 1 the Supreme Court expressly rejected the
broad premise furnished by Meyer,4 2 preferring instead to rest its decision
that an Arkansas anti-evolution statute was unconstitutional on narrower
ground-the establishment and free exercise clauses which mandate state
neutrality with respect to religion. 4 3 The Court said that "[n]o suggestion
has been made that Arkansas' law may be justified by considerations of state
policy other than the religious views of some of its citizens,"'' 4 and that
"[t]he law's effort was confined to an attempt to blot out a particular theory
because of its supposed conflict with the Biblical account, literally read." 45
Thus, the State's undoubted right to prescribe the "curriculum for the in-
stitutions it supports"' 46 did not include the right to bar "the teaching of a
scientific theory or doctrine where that prohibition is based on reasons that
violate the first amendment." 47
B. Freedom of Speech
Dicta in a concurring opinion in Epperson is the only indication that the
Court may feel that a curricular prohibition may violate the freedom of
speech clause. 48  Nonetheless, commentators have contended that speech
values are implicated when a state or school board expressly prohibits the
teaching of certain subject matter.49 Moreover, Professors Emerson and
Haber would apply principles of freedom of speech not only to curtail
41. 393 U.S. 97 (1968).
42. Id. at 105-06. The Court also refused to "explore the implications of that decision in
terms of the justiciability of the multitude of controversies that beset our campuses today." Id.
at 106.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 107 (footnote omitted). Earlier in the opinion the Court said: "The overriding fact
is that Arkansas' law selects from the body of knowledge a particular segment which it pros-
cribes for the sole reason that it is deemed to conflict with a particular interpretation of the
Book of Genesis by a particular religious group." Id. at 103 (footnote omitted).
45. Id. at 109. Although the language was less explicit than that of the Tennessee statute
upheld in the Scopes trial, Scopes v. State, 154 Tenn. 105, 289 S.W. 363 (1927), the Court
ascertained that the motivation for the law was the same-"to suppress the teaching of a theory
which, it was thought, 'denied' the divine creation of man"-and that it would in fact have that
effect. Id.
46. Meyer v. Nebraska, 362 U.S. 390, 402 (1923).
47. Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 107 (1968). In the absence of unconstitutional moti-
vation, a failure to include biology in the curriculum would not have produced the same result.
See Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 111 (1968) (Black, J., concurring); Canby, The First
Amendment and the State as Editor: Implications for Public Broadcasting, 52 TEx. L. REv.
1123, 1136 (1974).
48. Justice Stewart in a concurring opinion said that to make it a criminal offense for a
public school teacher to mention evolution would impinge on first amendment guarantees of
free communication. 393 U.S. at 116. See Nahmod, supra note 13, at 1504.
49. Nahmod, supra note 13, at 1504, Canby, supra note 47, at 1135-37.
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censorship, but to mandate a balanced classroom presentation of diverse
views.50
Although the free speech clause has been extended to protect the ex-
pression of both student 51 and teacher in public schools in some instances,5 2
the assumption that a classroom functions as a "free marketplace of ideas," a
precondition to the applicability of the clause, has not been universally ac-
cepted. States and school boards are neither obligated to open the cur-
riculum to all views or academic theories, 53 nor to permit teachers to use
methods and materials not included in the prescribed curriculum. 54 Be-
cause one function of public education is indoctrinative, some amount of
public regulation of classroom conduct-speech, materials, and methods-
inheres in public education. 55 Moreover, judicial oversight which would
require evaluation of the validity of the state's goals and the suitability of its
methods poses the problem for the courts of articulating justiciable stan-
dards. 56 Yet, recent cases have attempted to define a qualified right which
grants elementary and secondary school teachers limited freedom to deter-
mine their classroom teaching methods. 57
IV. PRESIDENTS COUNCIL AND MINARCINI:
CONSTRAINTS ON REMOVAL
The difficulties of controlling curricular choice through the freedom of
speech clause were encountered both in Minarcini and in Presidents Coun-
cil, District 25 v. Community School Board No. 25.58 The Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit, in Presidents Council, confronted as an issue of first
impression the question of whether there was any prohibition in the free
speech clause that should prevent a school board from removing a book it
50. Emerson & Haber, The Scopes Case in Modern Dress, 27 U. CH. L. REv. 522, 527
(1960). Emerson and Haber suggest that public education involves a "sector of communication
which has many of the elements of a closed system." Id. -at 526. Since the government main-
tains enormous control over the educational process at the elementary and secondary school
levels, and "the government is assuming an affirmative function in the system of education,"
id., Emerson and Haber would apply first amendment principles to curtail censorship and to
mandate a balanced presentation of diverse views.
51. See, e.g., Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503
(1969).
52. See, e.g., James v. Board of Educ., 461 F.2d 566 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1042
(1972).
53. Shauer, supra note 39, at 303-04; Canby, supra note 47, at 1136.
54. Shauer, supra note 39, at 305-06; see Canby, supra note 47 at 1136.
55. See, e.g., Developments, supra note 14, at 1050.
56. Id.
57. Shauer, supra note 39, at 303--04.
58. 457 F.2d 289 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 988 (1972).
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found objectionable from a public junior high school library. Affiliates of
parent and parent-teacher associations, three junior high school students,
seven parents and guardians of minors attending schools in the district, two
teachers, a librarian, and a principal sought to enjoin the school board from
removing all copies of Piri Thomas' Down These Mean Streets from the li-
braries of all the junior high schools in the district. The school board sub-
sequently modified its removal order, allowing the book to remain available
in those junior high schools whose libraries had purchased the book before
the board's decision. 59
In deciding the case the Second Circuit began by stating:
[E]vidently some authorized person or body has to make a deter-
mination as to what the library collection will be. It is predictable
that no matter what choice of books may be made by whatever
segment of academe, some other person or group may well dis-
sent. The ensuing shouts of book burning, witch hunting and viola-
tion of academic freedom hardly elevate this intramural strife to
first amendment constitutional proportions. If it did, there would
be a constant intrusion of the judiciary into the internal affairs of
the school. 60
The court rejected the plaintiffs' assertion that Epperson v. Arkansas was
relevant to Presidents Council:
[P]atently we have no religious establishment or free exercise
question, and neither do we have the banning of the teaching of
any theory or doctrine. The problem of the youth in the ghetto,
crime, drugs and violence have not been placed off limits by the
Board. . . .The intrusion of the Board here upon any first
amendment constitutional right of any category of plaintiffs is not
only not "sharp" or "direct", it is miniscule. 61
The Second Circuit concluded that there was no legally relevant distinc-
tion between the school board's authority to select books for the library ini-
tially, in which case it was not obligated to select any and all books, and the
board's authority to remove books. That a book had already been shelved
was not relevant because both acquisition and removal entailed selection. 62
The court stated:
59. 457 F.2d at 292-93. The court addressed itself to both resolutions.
60. Id. at 291-92.
61. 457 F.2d at 292. The Second Circuit seemed to suggest that had it found that there had
been a ban on the teaching of problems of ghetto youth it would have considered finding a
violation of the freedom of speech clause.
62. With regard to initial purchase of the books, the court said: "The public school library
obviously does not have to become the repository, at public expense, for books which are
deemed by proper authorities to be without merit either as works of art or science, simply
because they are not obscene within the statute." Id. at 292-93. The statute which was found to
19771 1041
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
This concept of a book acquiring tenure by shelving is indeed
novel and unsupportable under any theory of constitutional law we
can discover. It would seem clear to us that books which become
obsolete or irrelevant or where improperly selected initially, for
whatever reason, can be removed by the same authority which was
empowered to make the selection in the first place.63
The court distinguished the situation in Presidents Council from previous
cases on the basis of the type of injury to the plaintiffs. In Tinker v. Des
Moines Independent School District,64 the Supreme Court had found a regu-
lation banning the wearing of black armbands in classrooms to be an uncon-
stitutional infringement of the students' freedom of speech. School au-
thorities had tried to justify the regulation on the grounds that wearing the
armbands was likely to cause disruption and disorder. The Supreme Court
held that fear of disturbances was not a constitutionally valid justification for
the ban. 65 The Second Circuit held that Tinker was inapposite because in
Presidents Council there was no problem of freedom of speech or expression
of opinions on the part of any of the plaintiffs. Discussion of Down These
Mean Streets and its subject matter in or out of the classroom was not pro-
hibited by the board's actions in removing it from the library. 66
Finally, the court considered the motive of the school board in removing
the books, allowing some latitude for pragmatic problems of administration.
The administration of any library, whether it be a university or
particularly a public junior high school, involves a constant process
of selection and winnowing based not only on educational needs
but financial and architectural realities. To suggest that the shelv-
ing or unshelving of books creates a constitutional issue, particu-
larly where there is no showing of a curtailment of freedom of
speech or thought, is a proposition we cannot accept.67
be constitutional in Ginsburg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968), made it a crime to sell obscene
materials to minors under 17 years of age, irrespective of whether the material would be
obscene for adults. With regard to removal, the Second Circuit said: "If someone authored a
book advocating that the earth was flat, it could hardly be argued that the work could not be
removed from the public school library unless it was also obscene." 457 F.2d at 293. Appellants
had conceded, or at least chose not to attack, the board's authority to select library books, but
had suggested that the situation differed with respect to removal. Id.
63. Id. The Second Circuit's language, "where improperly selected, for whatever reason,
[books] can be removed," (emphasis added), seems to imply that the court would not look to
motivation in either the board's selection or removal of books. Yet in suggesting that it might
take a different approach if, as in Epperson, there were an absolute ban on any classroom
discussion of a particular subject, see note 61 supra, the court implied that it would look to
motivation. Id. The court seemed to think that library book choices were not important enough
to warrant judicial scrutiny.
64. 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
65. Id. at 511.
66. 457 F.2d at 293.
67. Id.
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Removing books because of "financial and architectural realities" is dif-
ferent from removing books because they reportedly disturb the moral at-
mosphere nurtured in public schools. 68 Accordingly, the Sixth Circuit in
Minarcini refused to read into the preceeding quotation from Presidents
Council an absolute right of the school board to remove books from the
library, and further stated that "if it [the above cited paragraph] were un-
qualified, we would not follow it." 6 9 Thus discarding Presidents Council,
the only precedent involving a substantially similar fact pattern, the Sixth
Circuit chose to base its reasoning on a different set of precedents.
In Minarcini, the court began its analysis by examining the minutes of
the school board meetings at which the books were banned. In the absence
of any explanation of the school board's actions that was neutral in first
amendment terms, the Court assumed that the board removed the books
because it objected to their content and felt it had the power to censor the
school library unfettered by the first amendment.7 0 Although the court rec-
ognized that neither the State of Ohio nor the Strongsville School Board was
constitutionally compelled to provide a library for the high school or to
choose any particular books, once having created this privilege, it was
barred from placing "conditions on the use of the library which were related
solely to the social or political taste of school board members." 7 1
The court emphasized the value of a public school library as an adjunct
to classroom discussion:
If one of the English teachers considered Joseph Heller's Catch-22
to be one of the more important modern American novels . . .we
assume that no one would dispute that the First Amendment's pro-
tection of academic freedom would protect both his right to say so
in class and his students' rights to hear him and to find and read
the book. Obviously, the students' success in this last endeavor
would be greatly hindered by the fact that the book sought had
been removed from the school library. The removal of books from
a school library is a much more serious burden upon freedom of
classroom discussion than the action found unconstitutional in
68. The lower court cited this language from Presidents Council as establishing an absolute
right of removal in the board. The Sixth Circuit, however, qualified that reading.
69. 541 F.2d at 581.
70. Id. at 582.
71. Id. The court cited Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967); Pickering v.
Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968); Douglas v. California, 370 U.S. 353 (1963); and Griffin v.
Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1955), for the proposition that "[it is too late in the day to doubt that
liberties of religion and expression may be infringed by the denial of or placing conditions upon
a benefit or privilege." 541 F.2d at 582. The court seemed to suggest that a right of access to
the books arose once the books were shelved.
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Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School Dis-
trict .... 72
That the disputed book might be available from sources outside the school
was not found to obviate that burden. 73 The court saw the library as "a
mighty resource in the free marketplace of ideas," 74 and "a forum for silent
speech" 75 -in its view an indispensible component for preserving freedom
of speech.
The court recognized that it was dealing "with a somewhat more difficult
concept than a direct restraint on speech," 76 because the question of re-
moval of books from the school library did not directly entail curtailment of
expression. Rather, it was "concerned with the right of students to receive
information which they and their teachers desire them to have." 77
In Minarcini the conclusion that the students had a constitutionally cog-
nizable right to be the unobstructed recipients of Vonnegut's and Heller's
expression (through their books) was supported by citing cases that have
developed "the right to know." The Sixth Circuit concluded that any doubt
as to the existence of this right was laid to rest by the Supreme Court's
analysis in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Council,
Inc., 78 which, along with Kleindienst v. Mande179 and Procunier v. Mar-
tinez,80 "serve[s] to establish firmly both the First Amendment right to
know which is involved in our instant case and the standing of student plain-
tiffs to raise the issue." 81
72. Id. The court's reference to Tinker, in which the banning of armbands from the class-
room was found to be an unconstitutional infringement of freedom of speech, is unsupported
and puzzling. See the discussion of Presidents Council, accompanying notes 64-66 supra. The
Sixth Circuit seemed to be using Tinker to justify application of other first amendment princi-
ples to the case since the Sixth Circuit found that classroom discussion was enhanced by the
presence of the books in the library and, therefore, students had a first amendment interest in
the books.
73. 541 F.2d at 582. The Court relied on freedom of speech cases and applied the doctrine
from them to the right to know. See note 81 infra.
74. 541 F.2d at 582.
75. Id. at 583. The Sixth Circuit apparently considered the school library to be more impor-
tant to a student's education than did the Second Circuit. See notes 62-63 supra. Perhaps the
Sixth Circuit felt it was less of an intrusion on curricular choice to scrutinize library acquisitions
than to scrutinize textbook decisions.
76. Id. at 583.
77. Id. (emphasis added).
78. 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
79. 408 U.S. 753 (1972).
80. 416 U.S. 396 (1974).
81. Id. The court apparently felt compelled to go through the freedom of speech rationale to
reach the right to know. Such preliminary analysis was, however, unnecessary. See note 92
infra.
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Thus, the Minarcini court, unlike the court in Presidents Council, found
a violation of the board's exercise of discretion based on the freedom of
speech clause. It would seem, therefore, that the Sixth and Second Circuits
reached opposite results on this important issue of law. To analyze the rela-
tive strength of their views it is necessary to understand the developing
right to know on which the Sixth Circuit placed so much emphasis.
V. THE RIGHT TO KNOW
Using the "reciprocal rights," or "right to know" rationale, courts have
determined that listeners or other recipients of expression who have been
denied access to expression protected by the first amendment have a right to
contest the denial. 82 The Supreme Court, dealing with the right to receive
advertising in Virginia State Board, summarized the theory of the right to
know: 83
Freedom of speech presupposes a willing speaker. But where a
speaker exists, as is the case here, the protection afforded is to the
communication, to its source and to its recipients both. This is
clear from the decided cases. In Lamont v. Postmaster General
. . . the Court upheld the First Amendment rights of citizens to
receive lolitical publications sent from abroad. More recently, in
Kleindienst v. Mandel . . . we acknowledged that this Court has
referred to a First Amendment right to "receive information and
ideas," and that freedom of speech "necessarily protects the right
to receive."' And in Procunier v. Martinez . . . where censorship
of prison inmates' mail was under examination, we thought it un-
necessary to assess the First Amendment rights of the inmates
themselves, for it was reasoned that such censorship equally in-
fringed the rights of noninmates to whom the correspondence was
addressed. There are numerous other expressions to the same ef-
fect in the Court's decisions.8
4
82. See generally Emerson, Legal Foundations of the Right to Know, 1976 WASH. U.L.Q.
1. Emerson suggests three situations in which "the right to know should receive direct constitu-
tional protection under the first amendment," id. at 6: firstly, "when the government attempts
to control expression by applying a sanction directly against the recipient, in lieu of or in
addition to one against the communicator," id.; secondly, "when the speaker is not in a position
to assert his rights," id. at 7, or "where the speaker does have standing but fails to take action
to vindicate his interests," id.; thirdly, "in certain situations when the government itself engages
in expression," id. at 6. The Supreme Court has not utilized the right to know doctrine in the
third way, id. at 8, and the right to know "ordinarily plays a secondary role" in cases under the
first category. Id. at 6.
83. '425 U.S. 748 (1976).
84..425 U.S. 748, 756-57 (1976) (footnote omitted).
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Therefore the Court concluded that if "there is a right to advertise, there is
a reciprocal right to receive the advertising," and that the potential recip-
ients could assert that right.8 5
Two of the three cases which the Court cited dealt with situations where
the party whose expression was being curtailed could not adequately enforce
his right. In Kleindienst v. Mandel,86 for example, a Belgian journalist and
Marxist theoretician, who had been inVited to the United States by univer-
sity groups and professors to present his views in various forums, was pre-
cluded from entering this country pursuant to the Immigration and National-
ity Act of 1952;87 as a foreign national, he had no constitutional right of
entry into this country. The Court concluded that the American citizens who
were party to the suit to allow his entry could assert their own first amend-
ment right to receive the information the speaker would express in order to
preserve the first amendment goal of maintaining a free marketplace of
ideas. 88
Similarly, in Procunier v. Martinez 89 the Supreme Court looked at cen-
sorship of prisoners' mail from the standpoint of the citizens who received
the mail. Although the prisoners whose mail was being censored might not
have been entitled to full first amendment protection, the Court suggested
that "[i]n the case of direct personal correspondence between inmates and
those who have a particularized interest in communicating with them, mail
censorship implicates more than the right of prisoners." 90  Thus, the
Court's free speech analysis centered on according full first amendment
liberties to the recipients of the correspondence rather than treating the case
as one "involving questions of prisoners' rights." 91
The Court in Virginia State Board extended the rationale beyond the
protection of particularized communications between a delineated speaker
and recipient, to allow the recipient directly, through the right to know, to
assert the rights of an- unspecified speaker. 92 Minarcini suggests that in
85. Id. at 757.
86. 408 U.S. 753 (1971).
87. Ch. 477, 66 Stat. 163.
88. 408 U.S. at 763.
89. 416 U.S. 396 (1976).
90. Id. at 408.
91. Id.
92. Thus, consumers, rather than the pharmacists themselves, vindicated the rights of the
pharmacists. Justice Rehnquist objected to the decision's extension of "standing to raise First
Amendment claims beyond previous decisions of the Court," 425 U.S. at 782-83 (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting). He maintained that the right to receive had not been denied because consumers
had alternative means of obtaining the information. Id. Therefore the consumers were really
asserting publishing rights of a third party. The majority responded that it knew of no case in
which speakers' rights had been abridged because their listeners had alternative means to re-
ceive their messages. Nor was the majority aware of any such limitation on the independent
right of the listener to receive the information. Id. at 757-58 n.15. Thus the Court extended the
right-to-receive rationale.
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some instances, the right to receive information, as developed in the
aforementioned cases, may allow students to vindicate the rights of contem-
porary novelists by insuring that curricular decisions are made for proper
educational purposes.
VI. MINARCINI AND THE RIGHT TO KNOW
Although the Sixth Circuit ultimately labeled the students' right as the
right to know, the court was unclear as to how the right should be applied.
The rights of the students in this case were treated as being coextensive
with those of the authors. As stated in Virginia State Board, "where a
speaker exists . . . the protection afforded is to the communication, to its
source and to its recipients both." 93 The conclusion that the court consid-
ered primarily the rights of the students is bolstered by its reference to
Procunier in which the Supreme Court felt it unnecessary to consider the
extent of prisoners' first amendment rights, but rather looked to the rights of
the recipients of the prisoners' letters.
The reference to Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School
District94 also implied consideration of the first amendment rights of stu-
dents. The Sixth Circuit, comparing the facts in Tinker 95 and Minarcini,
concluded that removal of a library book was a more serious burden on
classroom speech than the banning of armbands. In other words, students
had a first amendment interest in having the books available.
Freedom of speech, however, is not always absolute. Analysis of the in-
terest or goal asserted to support an infringement upon the right is often
required to ascertain its extent. 96 In Minarcini, the school board claimed
that orderly administration required that it have discretion to remove books
from the library. The court did not conclude that the students' right to know
precluded the school board's exercise of this discretion entirely. Based on
the minutes of the school board meetings, however, the court concluded
that there was no indication of a neutral rationale for the removal of the
books at issue; rather the decision had been based on the personal objec-
tions of the board members to the books' contents. 97 This rationale the
court deemed inadequate to support infringement of the students' right to
know.
The court enumerated hypothetical rationales that, in its opinion, would
have effectively negafed any attack on the board's removal of books: the
93. Id. at 756.
94. 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
95. See text accompanying note 65 supra.
96. See, e.g., Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546 (1975); Cox v. New
Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569 (1941).
97. 541 F.2d at 581.
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board could have removed a book without violating any rights when a copy
of the book wore out, when the book became obsolete, or lack of shelf space
demanded removal.98 These reasons for removing books relate to the na-
ture of the facility-in other words, they involve educational purposes or
needs. To remove books solely because the board objects to content is to
censor ideas, and censorship is not a valid educational objective. Because
this last motive was found to be operative, the court found that the
Strongsville board's decision to remove books was unconstitutional. 99
Had a valid educational objective accompanied the board's unconstitu-
tional motivation, the protection afforded the constitutionally protected
communication, the book, could be analogized to that given constitutionally
protected conduct of a teacher. 10 0 In Mount Healthy City School District v.
Doyle,' 01 for example, the Supreme Court held that even though a teacher
has limited rights in certain circumstances-he can be discharged for no
reason and has no right to a hearing prior to a decision not to rehire
him-he might establish a claim to reinstatement if a decision not to rehire
him was made by reason of his exercise of constitutionally protected first
amendment freedom. 102 The Court continued:
Initially, in this case, the burden was properly placed upon re-
spondent to show that his conduct was constitutionally protected,
and that this conduct was a "substantial factor"--or to put it in
other words, that it was a "motivating factor" in the Board's deci-
sion not to rehire him. Respondent having carried that burden...
the District Court should have gone on to determine whether the
Board had shown by a preponderance of the evidence that it would
98. Id.
99. Although courts are generally reluctant to inquire into motivation, in this case motive
was clear. The court drew the permissible inference that the board exercised its discretion to
make student reading conform to the orthodox social and political views of school board mem-
bers. See generally Ely, Legislative and Administrative Motivation in Constitutional Law, 79
YALE L.J. 1205 (1970); Brest, Palmer v. Thompson: An Approach to the Problem of Unconstitu-
tional Legislative Motivation, 1971 Sup. CT. REv. 95.
100. See, e.g., Maybey v. Reagan, 537 F.2d 1036 (9th Cir. 1976):
The potential for subterfuge exacerbates our dilemma. On the one hand, our reluc-
tance to intrude deeply into the administrative process may permit an inl-motivated
decision-maker to cite apparently legitimate grounds for non-retention. On the
other hand, solicitude for First Amendment rights, and the need for prophylactic
rules to prevent encroachments on them, may aid an incompetent employee. ...
Although motivational analyses may be slippery, the only way to erect adequate
barriers around First Amendment freedoms is for the trier of fact to delve into the
motives of the decision-maker.
Id. at 1045.
101. 97 S. Ct. 568 (1977).
102. Id. at 574. If the school board were to depart from established procedure, it might be
called upon to justify its actions even in the absence of a requirement that it give reasons for its
decisions. See text accompanying note 109 infra.
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have reached the same decision as to respondent's reemployment
even in absence of the protected conduct. 10 3
The decision to ban books in Minarcini is analogous to the refusal to
rehire-neither were motivated by valid educational objectives. The only
explanation offered by the board in Minarcini was a minority report which
stated that one of the books was "garbage." No necessity, such as inadequate
space, made removal of books from the library necessary. The board did not
follow its established procedure for textbook selection. The books had con-
tinuing faculty approval and further, literary value was conceded by the par-
ties. Thus, plaintiffs met their burden of showing that the content of the
books was constitutionally protected and that the content alone played a
substantial role in the board's decision to remove. The board offered no
further justification; therefore the decision was invalidated.
The Sixth Circuit suggested that there was no right-to-know issue in-
volved in the board's decisions concerning the purchase of books for the
school library. 04 However, if, as the court's construction of the available
precedent suggests, the relevant inquiry with respect to the right to know is
unconstitutional motivation, the exercise of discretion in purchasing books
cannot be distinguished from its use in removing books from the shelves.
Because censorship can be present in either context, principles of free
speech would entitle the absent speakers (the authors) to a fair consideration
of whether the books would further valid educational purposes.' 0 5
The only apparent distinction between a case involving selection of books
and one involving removal is an evidentiary problem in the former. It would
appear far easier to show or to infer censorship when a book is removed
than to show or to infer censorship when a book is not purchased. 10 6 This
103. Id. at 576. The Supreme Court referred to its decision in Village of Arlington Heights v.
Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 97 S. Ct. 555 (1977), for elaboration of "motivating factor." See
text accompanying notes 108-09 infra.
104. The Sixth Circuit recognized that students could assert their teachers' freedom of speech
rights but refused to consider whether teachers could make their choices prevail in the purchas-
ing lrocess. 541 F.2d at 579-80.
105. Assuming that the library of a public high school is a public forum, the refusal to select,
motivated by improper educational purposes, would constitute an unconstitutional prior re-
straint. Cf. Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546 (1975); Cox v. New Hamp-
shire, 312 U.S. 569 (1941) (enumerating circumstances qualifying established exceptions to the
doctrine of prior restraint: rejection of application must be based on regulation of time, place,
or manner related to the nature of the facility or applications from other users). The Sixth
Circuit assumed the library is a public forum. See text accompanying note 75 supra.
106. See Comment, Schoolboards, Schoolbooks and the Freedom to Learn, 59 YALE L.J. 928
(1950). Meaningful inquiry into constitutional motivation in curricular choice is difficult to
achieve. School boards have authority to inculcate students with good citizenship values. See
notes 3-18 supra. However, it is difficult for judges to distinguish instilling good citizenship
from compelling orthodoxy without substituting their value judgment for that of a board. For
approaches to unconstitutional motivation in curricular choice, see generally Ely, supra note 99;
Brest, supra note 99. The difficulty of achieving value inculcation while preserving a free mar-
ketplace in the public schools underlies Minarcini.
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does not mean, however, that it would be impossible to set standards to be
applied in determining motivation in a case of purchase. It has been
suggested that where a school board delegates authority to select books to
librarians or committees, and only participates in the selection process when
it wishes to control content in a specific instance, "it does not seem un-
reasonable to require the Board when challenged to justify the incursion in
terms of its educational policy and the editorial structure [i.e., the policies
governing the libraries] that it has created." 10 7
A recent Supreme Court opinion, Village of Arlington Heights v. Met-
ropolitan Housing Development Corporation,'0 8 supports the contention that
unconstitutional motivation, or a censorship orientation, can be inferred
from a departure from procedure. In Arlington Heights the Court listed a
number of factors useful to an inquiry into motivation:
The historical background of the decision is one evidentiary source
.... The specific sequence of events leading up (sic) the chal-
lenged decision also may shed some light on the decisionmaker's
purposes. . . . Departures from the normal procedural sequence
also might afford evidence that improper purposes are playing a
role. Substantive departures too may be relevant, particularly if
the factors usually considered important by the decisionmaker
strongly favor a decision contrary to the one reached.
The legislative or administrative history may be highly relevant,
especially where there are contemporary statements by members
of the decisionmaking body, minutes of its meetings, or reports. In
some extraordinary instances the members might be called to the
stand at trial to testify concerning the purpose of the official action
109
The district court in Minarcini found the purchasing process set up by
the board to be "fair, equitable and logical." 110  The court found further
that the record did not disclose arbitrary or capricious acts in administering
the procedure. Moreover, the district court stated:
The reasons expressed by Board members in support of their ac-
tion refusing the purchase of the initially proposed novels are not
unreasonable. Those reasons in substance reflect an attitude that
the proposed novels were adult-orientated and, therefore, less
suitable for use as curriculum text for grades 10 through 12 than
other available novels, and that the books were better suited for
college level instruction and study."' 1
107. Canby, supra note 47, at 1135, citing O'Neil, Libraries, Liberties and the First Amend-
ment, 42 U. CIN. L. REv. 209, 241-52 (1973).
108. 97 S. Ct. 555 (1977).
109. Id. at 564-65 (footnote omitted).
110. 384 F. Supp. at 706.
111. Id. at 703.
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Thus, although the books had been recommended by the faculty, neither
the district court nor the circuit court could infer unconstitutional motivation
in the purchasing process when such motivation was not clearly shown.
Presuming, however that the same considerations that governed the re-
moval of Catch-22 governed the board's refusal to purchase Catch-22, the
Sixth Circuit might still have refused to draw an inference of unconstitu-
tional motivation. Invalidating a board decision not to select books may be
more of an invasion by the judiciary into the social and political process than
interfering with removal. As emphasized in the district court's opinion in
Minarcini:
Ideological conflicts within communities of a free society
exacerbate and subside with the ever changing moods and struc-
ture of its population. The endless cycle moves from thesis to an-
tithesis through synthesis and back to thesis only to renew itself
from ever evolving dissent. Peaceful transition through the cycle,
i.e., synthesis of antithesis, is insured in an open society by pro-
portionate legislative representation founded in the elective pro-
cess ....
* . . The Board, as constituted in 1972, moved from its original
decision to exclude the purchase of certain controversial novels as
curriculum text... to a decision of the Board, as presently consti-
tuted, to include a controversial novel of similar substantive and
literary composition .... 112
This statement by the district court may represent the essential motivating
factor in its resolution of this case. Based on the result in the circuit court,
this reasoning carried great weight. The circuit court acknowledged the
school board's right, through its control over the curriculum, to have a sig-
nificant input in determining values that the public schools instill in stu-
dents. However, the court felt that there should be a limit to this right. A
school board may exercise an affirmative imput; however, it cannot control
the overall indoctrination process through censorship. Apparently the board
can choose new books for the library based on their content, but cannot
remove books based on their content. Society's values are supported by the
cumulative ideas of past generations-including past generations of school
boards. Although arguably the court should have qualified selection as well
as removal, the court did refuse to allow the Strongsville board to erase the
imput of past boards from this ongoing growth process. Thus, either due to
evidentiary difficulties or judicial deference manifested by a refusal to draw
an inference of unconstitutional motivation, the right to know will be more
difficult to vindicate in the selection process than in removal.
112. 384 F. Supp. at 704-05.
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Judicial consideration of the validity of the board's removal of a book
does not necessarily end once the board's decision is found to have been
based on a valid determination of the educational value of the book. The
court may still have to evaluate the basis for that determination. For in-
stance, had obscenity been offered as a reason why the books in Minarcini
were educationally inappropriate or had the board said that it feared the
books would cause disruption or disorder and therefore had minimal educa-
tional value, the court would have been competent to make its own deter-
mination of the validity of these premises. 113 If, however, a school board
merely postpones the student's exposure to the books until later in the stu-
dent's career, the court may be more willing to defer to the school board's
judgment.
One commentator described the boundaries of the free speech protection
accorded to teachers in the classroom setting. "Generally speaking, what the
first amendment does in the classroom is, first, protect the teacher from
board decisions which are unrelated to educational considerations and, sec-
ond, protect him from good faith board determinations of educational value
based on constitutionally impermissable considerations." 114 It would appear
that the court has concluded that the right to know should accord the stu-
dent in the classroom the same protection.
VII. CONFLICT IN THE CIRCUIT COURTS
Minarcini correctly suggests that the right to know imposes constitutional
constraints upon the school board's exercise of discretion in curricular
choice. Because the decision is unprecedented, it will be consulted by
courts facing similar situations in the future.11 5 Unfortunately, the prece-
dential value of the decision may be undermined because the opinion is
vague and leaves much to inference. Yet it sustains intervention by the
courts in curricular choice on the basis of the freedom of speech clause and
reaches the correct conclusion.
Judicial intervention in curricular choice is consistent with a growing dis-
enchantment with reliance upon administrative expertise and with the
courts' willingness to look behind administrative decisionmaking in order to
prevent arbitrary and capricious actions. 116 The Sixth Circuit concluded
113. See Nahmod, First Amendment Protection for Learning and Teaching: The Scope of
Judicial Review, 18 WAYNE L. REv. 1479, 1501 (1972). See also Miller, Teachers Freedom of
Expression Within the Classroom: A Search for Standards, 8 GA. L. Rav. 837 (1974).
114. See Nahmod, supra note 113, at 1503.
115. Commentators predict that the current wave of curriculum litigation will continue. See
generally Nahmod, supra note 113; Schauer, supra note 39.
116. See, e.g., Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396 (1974). Project, supra note 3, at 1422
n.258.
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that assertion by students of the first amendment right to know at least
avoids censorship of constitutionally protected expression. The court avoided
defining the limits of the school board's discretionary authority to structure
the curriculum 1 1 7 by carefully limiting consideration to the particular cur-
ricular decision to remove specific books from the school library.
1 18
In contrast to the Sixth Circuit in Minarcini the Second Circuit in Presi-
dents Council felt that if it ruled for the plaintiffs it would be reaching
beyond the limits of its power. 119 The court in Presidents Council em-
phasized that it found no violation of freedom of speech in the school board's
action.1 20  Had the Supreme Court already announced Virginia State Board
of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Ic.,121 which went
beyond the right to receive particularized communications to the broader
right to know, 122 the Second Circuit might have been more amenable to the
Minarcini °result. 1 2 Nonetheless, the cases are distinguishable. In Presi-
dents Council, unlike Minarcini where it was clear that the board was moti-
vated by personal value judgments, the board's motivation in removing the
books was unclear. 124 Moreover, the Second Circuit emphasized that the
books were still available to the parents of the students through the school
system. One cannot know how the court would have reacted had this not
been the case.125
Thus Minarcini and Presidents Council are not necessarily irreconcilable.
In fact, similar themes run through both: the judicial reluctance to "inter-
vene in the resolution of conflicts which arise in the daily operation of school
systems," 126 the failure to confront the limits of school board authority over
the content of curriculum, and the lack of precedent with which to protect
these constitutional claims. Assuming courts reconcile the Sixth and Second
Circuit opinions based upon factual difference, then it is likely that in future
cases dealing with removal of books from a public school library the school
117. The court reaffirmed the school board's, rather than the professional teaching staff's,
power to choose curriculum.
118. This is not to say that the limits of a school board's discretion are unascertainable.
Unconstitutional motivation can define limitations on school board authority because once un-
constitutional motivation is shown a board's decision is unjustifiable.
119. See text accompanying notes 61-63 supra.
120. Id.
121 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
122. See note 92 supra.
123. Id. Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396 (1974), was also decided after Presidents Coun-
cil, and in that case the Supreme Court found "a narrower basis for decision," by considering
the rights of free citizens, as opposed to those of prisoners. Id. at 408.
124. See text accompanying notes 61-63 supra.
125. Id.
126. Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104-05 (1968). In both cases the Court quoted from
Epperson which stated the Court's hesitancy to involve the judiciary in the operation of public
schools.
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board's motivation will be the essential issue. This will require a case-by-
case factual analysis.
VIII. CONCLUSION: BEYOND MINARCINI
As early as 1950, potential dangers in local selection of books and teach-
ing materials were being anticipated:
Suppression of opinion in a public school is the antithesis of educa-
tion .... Administratively, its inherent evil is an incapacity to
draw the line. Once a book banning precedent is established, fu-
ture exclusions are made simpler....
... A recent study conducted by the American Council on
Education indicates that current teaching materials are "guilty of
failing to come to grips with basic issues in the complex problems
of human relations." Perhaps school boards might better devote
their energies towards establishment of school programs wherein
basic controversial issues would be openly studied and dis-
cussed ... -
But for those who have less faith in the Freedom to Learn, an
exemplary legal sanction is urgent .... 127
While the issues and the basis for legal action 12 8 have not changed since
the 1950's, the Freedom to Learn theory has been replaced by the right to
know.
Courts have not undertaken to establish academic freedom as a constitu-
tional right in itself. 129 Ideals of academic freedom-the right of an indi-
vidual member of the faculty to teach, research, and publish without
interference-apply to higher education more readily than to public elemen-
tary and secondary schools. The traditional view has been that public school
students are less mature and therefore the emphasis at that level is on
transmitting rather than discovering knowledge.' 30 In the absence of the
development of a unified theory of academic freedom, the courts have as-
similated problems encountered in public education into established legal
categories. 131
127. Comment, Schoolboards, Schoolbooks and the Freedom to Learn, 59 YALE L.J. 928,
953-54 (1950) (footnotes omitted).
128. The basis for legal action is the assertion that the discretion of school boards is limited.
Id. at 944-53.
129. See, e.g., T. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 607-08 (1970).
Emerson explores the possibility of establishing academic freedom as an independent constitu-
tional right analagous to privacy or freedom of association. Alternatively, be suggests the possi-
bility of construing the first amendment to support academic freedom. (However, neither ap-
proach would fully satisfy him.).
130. See, e.g., Project, supra note 3, at 1440 and authorities cited therein.
131. See Developments, supra note 14, at 1050-51.
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Although courts have attempted to construe the first amendment so as to
give students and teachers some measure of protection, the more difficult
issues have not yet been faced.1 32 It has generally been accepted judicially
that the university is a free marketplace of ideas, but the notion that public
school students are capable of dealing with controversial subjects has only
recently been recognized by the courts.' 33 While it has become apparent
that the lines between high school and college students may not be so firmly
drawn as once believed, line drawing between high school and junior high
and elementary school pupils may pose more complex issues.' 34 Finally, in
view of the fact that one function of the public school is to indoctrinate,
curricular choice involves more than freedom of speech; evaluation of con-
tent and textbook selection must involve an exercise of discretion.' 35 The
state, rather than the public school teacher or student, presently has the
power to make these judgments. 136
Thus, the real conflict underlying Minarcini is the tension between popu-
lar control of education by the local community and the professional au-
tonomy of teachers and librarians to determine what students may learn and
read.'2 7 A further complication involved is the right of parents to partici-
pate in educational decisionmaking and the responsiveness of school ad-
ministrators to the wishes of parent and community organizations.' 38 Arfd
finally, recognition of the rights of students themselves to determine what to
learn adds an additional factor to the complexity of interests involved in
curricular choice.' 39
Thus, the issues facing courts beyond Minarcini are varied and complex.
Deference to the judgment of public school administrators is advisable. But
where it is shown that a particular action has no demonstrable educational
purpose, the courts should intervene to protect constitutional rights and the
integrity of public education.
JoY KOLETSKY
132. See, e.g., T. EMERsON, supra note 129, at 607-08.
133. See, e.g., Project, supra note 3, at 1444-47.
134. See, e.g., Nahmod, supra note 113, at 1491.
135. See, e.g., Canby, The First Amendment and the State as Editor: Implications for Public
Broadcasting, 52 TEx. L. REv. 1123, 1136 (1974).
136. Id. at 1136. See text accompanying note 8 supra.
137. See, e.g., F. WIBT & M. KIBST, THE POLITICAL WEB OF AMERICAN SCHOOLS 95
(1972).
138. Goldstein, The Asserted Constitutional Right of Public School Teachers to Determine
What They Teach, 124 U. PA. L. REv. 1293, 1321 n.94 (1976). Goldstein contends Presidents
Council was clearly correct in its accommodation of the interest involved. Id. at 1334.
139. In Minarcini the interests of student and teacher coincided. Query whether the court
would have reached the same result had teachers rejected the books.
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